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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tyler Shawn Clapp appeals from the order of the district court denying his motion to
correct an illegal sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a). On appeal, Clapp contends the
district court erred by denying his Rule 35 motion.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A jury found Clapp guilty of felony DUI and being a persistent violator of the law.
(Supp. R., pp.384-94. 1) The district court ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation
report (PSI) in advance of sentencing. (Supp. R., p.395.) The PSI recommended that the court
impose a term of imprisonment. (Supp. Tr., p.488, Ls.7-10. 2)
During sentencing, defense counsel argued for a period of retained jurisdiction to “ensure
that the treatment [recommended by the psychological evaluation], as pointed out and needed and
I believe mandated by Idaho Code 19-2523, would take place.” (Supp. Tr., p.476, L.19 – p.477,
L.4.) In response, the district court asked defense counsel whether the court had to order
treatment in order to comply with § 19-2523 if it imposed a prison sentence. (Supp. Tr., p.480,
Ls.5-17.) Defense counsel responded, “No, Your Honor, I think you can order that.” (Supp. Tr.,
p.480, Ls.18-19.) He explained, “I just don’t think that a prison sentence would necessarily
composite all of the things that are recommended for Mr. Clapp. I think that that would be better
accomplished on a Rider.” (Supp. Tr., p.480, Ls.19-23.) Having read the recommendations of
the clinical neuropsychologist, the district court acknowledged Clapp’s “long history of
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To avoid confusion, the state adopts the Appellant’s citation designations. (See Appellant’s
brief, p.1 n.1.)
2
The PSI itself does not appear in the appellate record.
1

depression, and severe anxiety” but noted that Clapp could seek the recommended treatment
“when he gets out on parole.” (Supp. Tr., p.491, Ls.6-16.) Ultimately, the court imposed and
executed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. (Supp. R., pp.667-69; Supp.
Tr., p.490, L.18 – p.491, L.1.) The court did not, however, authorize treatment. (See
- - Supp. R.,
pp.667-69.)
Clapp subsequently filed a motion to excuse counsel and proceed pro se, which the court
granted. (R., pp.20-27.) Clapp then filed a pro se motion under I.C.R. 35(a) to correct an illegal
sentence. (R., pp.28-34.) Relevant to this appeal, he argued in essence that the district court
erred by failing to “authorize treatment as required under Idaho Code § 19-2523.” (R., pp.30-31,
34.) The district court denied the motion. (R., pp.37-40.) The court determined that it was not
required to authorize treatment under § 19-2523 and therefore the sentence imposed was not
illegal from the face of the record. (Id.)
Clapp timely appealed. (R., pp.42-44.)
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ISSUE
Clapp states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Clapp’s Rule 35(a) motion.
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Clapp failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his Rule 35 motion?
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ARGUMENT
Clapp Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His Rule 35(a) Motion
A.

Introduction
In denying Clapp’s Rule 35(a) motion, the district court concluded that the sentence

imposed was not illegal from the face of the record because the court was not required to
authorize treatment under I.C. § 19-2523(2). (R., pp.37-40.) “[M]indful that the district court’s
failure to authorize treatment under I.C. § 19-2523(2) does not necessarily make the overall
sentence itself unlawful,” Clapp nevertheless asserts on appeal that “the district court erred by
denying the Rule 35(a) motion because the judgment of conviction does not specifically
authorizing [sic] treatment as required by I.C. § 19-2523(2).” (Appellant’s brief, p.4.) Clapp’s
argument lacks merit. Applicable law reveals that the district court properly denied Clapp’s Rule
35(a) motion.
B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) is a narrow rule that allows a trial court to correct an illegal

sentence at any time.

State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009).

Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law, over which the Court exercises free review.
State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397, 400 (2007).
C.

The District Court Did Not Impose An Illegal Sentence
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) provides, “The court may correct a sentence that is illegal from

the face of the record at any time.” I.C.R. 35(a). “[T]he term ‘illegal sentence’ under Rule 35 is
narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not involve
significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing.” Clements, 148 Idaho at 86, 218
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P.3d at 1147. Rule 35(a) “is not a vehicle designed to reexamine the facts underlying the case to
determine whether a sentence is illegal; rather, the rule only applies to a narrow category of cases
in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law ….” Id. (citation
omitted).
Here, the district court correctly determined that Clapp’s sentence is “not illegal from the
face of the record.” (R., p.40.) Idaho Code § 19-2523(2) provides:
(2) The court shall authorize treatment during the period of confinement or
probation specified in the sentence if, after the sentencing hearing, it concludes by
clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) The defendant suffers from a severe and reliably diagnosable mental illness or
defect resulting in the defendant’s inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law;
(b) Without treatment, the immediate prognosis is for major distress resulting in
serious mental or physical deterioration of the defendant;
(c) Treatment is available for such illness or defect;
(d) The relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment are such that a
reasonable person would consent to treatment. (of the offense charged.)
I.C. § 19-2523(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the district court was only required to authorize
treatment if, after the sentencing hearing, it concluded by clear and convincing evidence that the
criteria enumerated in subsections (a)-(d) were present in Clapp’s case. See State v. Leach, 135
Idaho 525, 532, 20 P.3d 709, 716 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding district court must authorize
treatment on remand because all the criteria specified in § 19-2523(2) were present).
In imposing Clapp’s sentence, the district court considered the applicability of I.C. § 192523(2). (Supp. Tr., p.476, L.19 – p.477, L.4; p.480, Ls.5-23.) The district court was cognizant
of Clapp’s mental health and substance abuse issues. (Supp. Tr., p.491, Ls.6-16.) The court was
also aware of the fact that Clapp could benefit from certain treatments. (Id.) Nevertheless, the
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court did not conclude by clear and convincing evidence that any of the requisite criteria set forth
in § 19-2523(2)(a)-(d) were present in Clapp’s case. (See Supp. Tr., p.488, L.2 – p.491, L.20; R.,
pp.39-40.) Because the district court did not conclude, after the sentencing hearing, that any of
the requisite criteria set forth in subsections (a)-(d) were present in Clapp’s case, it was under no
obligation to authorize treatment during the period of confinement pursuant to § 19-2523(2).
Accordingly, the sentence imposed is not illegal on the face of the record, and the district court
properly denied Clapp’s Rule 35(a) motion on that basis.
Clapp argues that the district court’s failure to authorize treatment pursuant to I.C. § 192523(2) was error clear from the face of the record. (Appellant’s brief, p.4.) His argument fails
for two reasons.
First, Clapp’s argument has no basis in law. According to Clapp, the district court was
required to authorize treatment because, at the sentencing hearing, the court acknowledged that
he suffered from treatable mental health issues. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.) This argument
disregards the correct legal standard. Proper application of I.C. § 19-2523(2) reveals that the
district court is required to authorize treatment during the period of confinement only if, after the
sentencing hearing, it concludes by clear and convincing evidence that the criteria set forth in
subsections (a)-(d) are present. See I.C. § 19-2523(2); Leach, 135 Idaho at 532, 20 P.3d at 716.
In other words, merely acknowledging treatable mental health issues during sentencing is
insufficient to trigger § 19-2523(2)’s treatment authorization requirement. In this case, the
district court applied the correct legal standards and determined that the sentence imposed was
not illegal because the relevant criteria are not present in this case. (R., p.40 (stating that it “did
not conclude by clear and convincing evidence, after the sentencing hearing, that treatment for
mental illness was necessary.”).)
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Clapp cites Leach in support of his argument. (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) However, Leach
does not support Clapp’s argument as it is both factually and legally distinguishable from the
instant case. In Leach, the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery after cutting a child’s
throat with a knife during a psychotic episode. Leach, 135 Idaho at 528, 20 P.3d at 712. The
evidence presented during the sentencing hearing showed that Leach suffered from
schizoaffective disorder with psychotic hallucinations, but that her illness was well controlled by
medication and therapy. Id. While on probation, Leach’s treating psychiatrist directed Leach to
be hospitalized because of a deterioration of her mental stability. Id. During a subsequent
hearing to resolve several alleged probation violations, Leach’s psychiatrist testified that Leach
was experiencing an increase in the number of auditory hallucinations urging her to commit acts
of violence. Id. The court found that Leach violated the conditions of her probation, revoked her
probation, and ordered execution of her original sentence. Id. at 529, 20 P.3d at 713. On appeal,
Leach argued that her sentence violated I.C. § 19-2523(2) because the court failed to authorize
treatment when it revoked her probation and executed the underlying sentence. Id. The Idaho
Court of Appeals agreed because it was “apparent that all participants in the proceedings below
recognized that the criteria specified in § 19-2523(2) [were] present in Leach’s case.” Id. at 53132, 20 P.3d at 715-16.
Unlike Leach, the criteria specified in § 19-2523(2)(a)-(d) were not present in this case.
Clapp has never contended, much less shown, that his mental illness resulted in an inability to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5; R., pp.28-34.) Likewise, he has not argued or shown that without
treatment, his immediate prognosis is for major distress that would result in serious mental or
physical deterioration. (Id.) As to whether the recommended treatments are even available in
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prison, Clapp admits that some, such as the sleep study, are not. (Appellant’s brief, p.2; R.,
p.31.)

Finally, he has never argued that the relative risks and benefits of treatment or

nontreatment are such that a reasonable person would consent to treatment. (See Appellant’s
brief, pp.4-5; R., pp.28-34.) Because the criteria specified in § 19-2523(2) were not present in
this case, the district court was not required to authorize treatment during the period of
confinement, unlike the district court in Leach.
Second, Clapp’s argument that the district court erred when it failed to authorize
treatment pursuant to I.C. § 19-2523(2) is not actually an argument that his unified sentence of
fifteen years, with five years fixed, is a sentence that is “simply not authorized by law.” Even it
were, Clapp conceded during the sentencing hearing, that the court would not be “out of
compliance” with § 19-2523 if it imposed a prison sentence without authorizing treatment.
(Supp. Tr., p.476, L.19 – p.477, L.4; p.480, Ls.5-23.) Likewise, he concedes on appeal that “the
district court’s failure to authorize treatment under I.C. § 19-2523(2) does not necessarily render
the overall sentence itself unlawful.” (Appellant’s brief, p.4).
In sum, Clapp has failed to show that his sentence is illegal on the face of the record
because the district court did not authorize treatment pursuant to I.C. § 19-2523(2). Accordingly,
he has failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his Rule 35(a) motion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the order of the district court denying the
Rule 35(a) motion.
DATED this 11th day of May, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of May, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

JRP/dd

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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